廈門大學(xué)管理學(xué)院邀請(qǐng)李寧忠老師作了一場(chǎng)題為“ Restrictions on Managers’ Outside Employment Opportunities and Asymmetric Disclosure of Bad versus Good News(對(duì)經(jīng)理人以外的就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)，對(duì)好消息壞的不對(duì)稱披露的限制)”的講座，廈門大學(xué)管理學(xué)院現(xiàn)設(shè)有工商管理在職研究生一級(jí)學(xué)科博士學(xué)位授權(quán)點(diǎn)(含會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)、企業(yè)管理、技術(shù)經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理、旅游管理)，工商管理博士后流動(dòng)站，6個(gè)教科類碩士學(xué)位授權(quán)點(diǎn)(會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)、企業(yè)管理、技術(shù)經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理、旅游管理、管理科學(xué)與工程、系統(tǒng)工程)，2個(gè)專業(yè)碩士學(xué)位授權(quán)點(diǎn)(MBA、EMBA)。在職研究生講座的主要內(nèi)容是：

　　本研究調(diào)查的自愿披露的企業(yè)管理人員的境外就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)的限制的影響。在不可避免披露原則(IDD)通過(guò)在美國(guó)的州法院承認(rèn)其企業(yè)從加入或在他們的解雇形成與競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手公司的經(jīng)理總部設(shè)地方較大的限制。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，相對(duì)于好消息，壞消息的不對(duì)稱扣繳大于在承認(rèn)IDD比的其他國(guó)家，而這種效應(yīng)在更大的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股，分析師以下內(nèi)容，董事會(huì)獨(dú)立性的企業(yè)弱。這些結(jié)果表明，管理人員的境外就業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)的限制，對(duì)公司信息披露行為有顯著意想不到的效果。我們通過(guò)顯示相對(duì)于好消息，壞消息的不對(duì)稱扣繳較大的國(guó)家有競(jìng)業(yè)禁止協(xié)議，勞動(dòng)合同，從加入或形成一個(gè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的公司禁止員工更嚴(yán)格的執(zhí)法進(jìn)一步驗(yàn)證了這一結(jié)論。我們也記錄了對(duì)信息披露的國(guó)際直撥電話及競(jìng)業(yè)禁止協(xié)議的影響是漸進(jìn)對(duì)方。

　　原文：This study examines the effect of restrictions on managers’ outside employment opportunities on voluntary corporate disclosure. The recognition of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) by courts in the U.S. states in which the firms are headquartered place greater restrictions on the managers from joining or forming a rival company upon their dismissal. We show that asymmetric withholding of bad news relative to good news is greater in states that recognize the IDD than in other states, and that this effect is weaker in firms with greater institutional ownership, analyst following, and board independence. These results suggest that restrictions on managers’ outside employment opportunities have a significant unintended effect on corporate disclosure behavior. We further validate this conclusion by showing that the asymmetric withholding of bad news relative to good news is greater in states with stricter enforcement of noncompetition agreements, employment contracts that prohibit employees from joining or forming a competing firm. We also document that the effects of the IDD and noncompetition agreements on disclosure are incremental to each other.